合作发表的一篇IEEE Communicaitons Letters 在线发表,利用分层博弈模型分析了不完全信道信息条件下的智能抗干扰传输。

Title:Bayesian Stackelberg Game for Antijamming Transmission With Incomplete Information

Authors:

Luliang Jia, Fuqiang Yao, Youming Sun, Student Member, IEEE, Yingtao Niu, and Yonggang Zhu

Abstract— The smart jammers pose a severe threat to wireless communications due to their abilities of learning the users’transmission strategies. A Stackelberg game can be formulated to model and analyze the hierarchical interactions between the userand the smart jammer. In this letter, an antijamming Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information is proposed. In the proposed game, the user who acts as the leader has the privilegeover the smart jammer and takes actions first, whereas the smartjammer acting as the follower moves subsequently. Moreover,the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is derived, and the existenceand the uniqueness of SE are demonstrated. Simulation results are presented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed antijamming Bayesian Stackelberg game.