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本章的标题是“碎片化与整体性”。今天考虑这个问题尤其重要,因为碎片化现在非常普遍,不仅在整个社会,而且在每个人身上;这导致了一种普遍的思维混乱,从而产生了一系列无穷无尽的问题,并严重干扰了我们感知的清晰性,以至于阻止我们解决其中的大多数问题。
因此,艺术、科学、技术和一般人类工作被分为不同的专业,每个专业都被认为在本质上与其他专业分开。由于对这种状况的不满,人们设立了更多的跨学科科目,其目的是统一这些专业,但这些新科目最终主要是增加更多独立的碎片,然后整个社会发展到分裂成不同的国家和不同的宗教、政治、经济、种族群体等。相应地,人类的自然环境被视为单独存在的部分的集合,可供不同人群开发。同样,每个人根据其不同的欲望、目标、野心、忠诚、心理特征等,被分割成大量独立且相互冲突的部分,以至于人们普遍认为,在某种程度上,神经症是不可避免的,而许多超出“正常”分裂限度的人被归类为偏执狂、精神分裂、精神病等。
认为所有这些碎片单独存在的观念显然是一种幻觉,这种幻觉只能导致无尽的冲突和混乱。事实上,从本质上讲,试图按照碎片是真的分开的观念生活,导致了我们今天面临的一系列日益严重的极其紧迫的危机。因此,众所周知,这种生活方式带来了污染、自然平衡的破坏、人口过剩、世界范围内的经济和政治混乱,以及创造了一个身心不健康的整体环境。对于大多数必须生活在其中的人来说。面对看似压倒性的、完全不同的社会力量,超出了卷入其中的人们的控制甚至理解范围,个人都产生了一种普遍的无助和绝望感。
确实,在某种程度上,人类在思维中将事物分析、分开,以便将问题减少到可以处理的程度,这始终是必要且适当的。显然,如果在我们的实际技术工作中我们试图同时处理整个现实,我们就会陷入困境。因此,从某些方面来说,专门研究科目的创建和劳动分工是向前迈出的重要一步。甚至更早的时候,人类首次认识到自己与自然并不相同,这也是至关重要的一步,因为这使得他的思维具有某种自主性成为可能,这使他能够超越自然直接给定的限制,首先是在他的想象中,最终是在他的实际工作中。
然而,人类这种将自身与环境分离开来并对事物进行多重分割和分配的能力导致了一系列负面的、破坏性的结果,因为人类失去了对自己所做事情的认识,从而使分析过程超出了其正常运作的范围。从本质上讲,分析过程是一种主要在实际、技术和功能活动领域方便和有用的思考方式(例如,将一块土地划分为不同的田地,在这些田地中种植各种作物)。然而,当这种思维模式更广泛地应用于人对自己和他所生活的整个世界的认识(即自我世界观)时,人就不再认为由此产生的划分仅仅是有用或方便的,而是开始看到并体验他自己和他的世界实际上是由单独存在的碎片组成的。在支离破碎的自我世界观的引导下,人的行为方式试图将自己和世界打碎,使一切似乎都符合他的思维方式。这样,人就获得了其支离破碎的自我世界观的正确性的明显证据,尽管人当然忽略了这样一个事实:正是他按照自己的思维方式造成了这种支离破碎的局面,而这种支离破碎现在看来已经具有了自主的存在,不依赖于人的意志和欲望。
自古以来,人就意识到这种看似独立存在的分裂状态,并在人与自然、人与人之间分裂之前,投射出更早的“黄金时代”的神话。事实上,人类一直在寻求整体性——精神、身体、社会和个体。
考虑到英语中的“健康”一词是基于盎格鲁撒克逊语单词“hale”,意思是“整体”,这是有启发性的:也就是说,健康就是整体,我认为,这大致相当于希伯来语“shalem”。同样,英语中的“holy”与“whole”的词根相同。所有这些都表明,人类始终意识到,整体或整合是使生活有价值的绝对必要条件。然而,多年来,人总体上生活在支离破碎之中。
当然,为什么会发生这一切的问题需要仔细关注和认真思考。
在本章中,我们的注意力将集中在我们的一般思维形式在维持碎片化和挫败我们对整体性或完备性的最深的冲动方面所发挥的微妙但至关重要的作用。为了让讨论有具体的内容,我们一定程度上从目前的科学研究角度来谈,这是我比较熟悉的领域(当然,我们也将牢记正在讨论的问题的总体意义)。
首先在科学研究中,然后在更一般的背景下,我们要强调的是,将我们的思想内容视为“对世界本来面目的描述”这一几乎普遍的习惯正在不断带来碎片化,或者我们可以说,在这种习惯中,我们的思想被认为是与客观现实直接对应的。由于我们的思想充满了差异和区别,因此这种习惯导致我们将这些视为真正的划分,从而使世界被视为和体验为实际上被分解成碎片。
这种思想所涉及的思想与现实之间的关系实际上比单纯的对应关系复杂得多。因此,在科学研究中,我们的思考很大一部分是在理论方面。 “理论”一词源自希腊语“theoria”,与“剧院”同根,意思是“观看”或“制造奇观”。因此,可以说理论主要是一种洞察形式,即一种看待世界的方式,而不是一种关于世界如何的知识形式。
例如,在古代,人们有这样一种理论,认为天体物质与地球物质有根本不同,地球上的物体自然会下落,而天体(例如月亮)自然会留在天空中。然而,随着现代的到来,科学家们开始提出这样的观点:地球物质和天体物质没有本质区别。当然,这意味着天上的物体,例如月亮,应该坠落,但很长一段时间以来,人们没有注意到这一含义。牛顿突然灵光一现,发现当苹果落下时,月亮也会落下,所有物体也确实会落下。因此,他提出了万有引力理论,其中所有物体都被视为落向不同的中心(例如地球、太阳、行星等)。这构成了一种看待天空的新方式,行星的运动不再通过天上物质与地上物质之间本质区别的古老观念来看待。相反,人们根据所有物质(天上的和地上的)向各个中心的下落速率来考虑这些运动,当发现某些东西不能用这种方式解释时,人们就会寻找并经常发现新的和未知的行星天体正在向哪个方向坠落(从而证明了这种观察方式的相关性)。
牛顿式的洞察在几个世纪以来一直运作良好,但最终(就像之前的古希腊的洞察一样)当扩展到新领域时,它会导致不明确的结果。在这些新领域中,发展了新形式的洞察(相对论和量子论)。这些给出了与牛顿完全不同的世界图景(当然,后者被发现在有限的领域中仍然有效)。如果我们假设理论给出了真实的知识,对应于“现实本身”,那么我们就不得不得出结论,牛顿理论直到1900年左右都是正确的,之后它突然变成了错误,而相对论和量子理论突然变成了真理。然而,如果我们说所有的理论都是见解,这些见解既非真亦非假,而是在某些领域是清晰的,而超出这些领域时就不清楚了,那么这种荒谬的结论就不会出现。然而,这意味着我们并不将理论与假设等同起来。正如该词的希腊词根所示,假说是一种假设,即一种被“置于”我们推理之下的想法,作为临时基础,需要通过实验来检验其真实性或虚假性。然而,众所周知,对于一个旨在涵盖整个现实的一般性假设,不可能有确凿的实验证明其真伪。相反,人们会发现(例如托勒密的历法或牛顿概念在相对论和量子理论出现之前的失败),当人们试图用旧理论来洞察新领域时,旧理论变得越来越不清晰。仔细关注这种情况是如何发生的,通常是构建新理论的主要线索,这些新理论构成了进一步的新形式的洞察。
因此,我们不是假设旧的理论在某个时间点被证伪,而只是说人类正在不断发展新形式的洞察,这些洞察在某一点上是清晰的,然后往往会变得不清楚。在这项活动中,显然没有理由假设存在或将会存在最终形式的洞察(对应于绝对真理),甚至没有一系列稳定的近似值。相反,从本质上讲,人们可能会期待新形式的洞察的不断发展(然而,这将吸收旧形式的某些关键特征作为简化,就像相对论与牛顿理论一样)。然而,正如前面指出的,这意味着我们的理论主要被视为看待整个世界的方式(即世界观),而不是“关于事物如何存在的绝对真实的知识”(或作为稳步接近后者)。
当我们通过理论洞察来看待世界时,我们所获得的事实知识显然会被我们的理论所塑造和形成。 例如,在古代,有关行星运动的事实是用托勒密的 “外接圆”(圆与圆的叠加)思想来描述的。在牛顿时代,这一事实是根据精确确定的行星轨道来描述的,并通过向各个中心的下落速率进行分析。后来出现了根据爱因斯坦的空间和时间概念相对论地看到的事实。再后来,一种非常不同的事实在量子理论中被指定(它通常只给出一个统计事实)。在生物学中,现在用进化论来描述这一事实,但在早期,它是用生物的固定物种来表达的。
更一般地说,鉴于感知和行动,我们的理论见解提供了我们事实知识的主要组织来源。事实上,我们的整体体验就是这样形成的。正如康德首先指出的那样,所有经验都是根据我们思维的类别来组织的,即根据我们思考空间、时间、物质、实体、因果关系、偶然性、必然性、普遍性、特殊性等的方式来组织。可以说,这些范畴是洞察万物的一般形式或方式,因此,从某种意义上说,它们是一种理论(当然,这种层次的理论一定是在人类进化的早期就已经形成了)。
感知和思维的清晰度显然要求我们普遍意识到我们的经验是如何由我们一般思维方式中隐含或明确的理论提供的洞察(清晰或混乱)塑造的。为此,强调经验和知识是一个过程是有用的,而不是认为我们的知识是关于某种单独的经验。我们可以将这一过程称为经验知识(连字符表明这是一个完整运动的两个不可分割的方面)。
现在,如果我们没有意识到我们的理论是不断变化的洞察形式,为一般经验提供了形状和形式,那么我们的视野就会受到限制。可以这样说:对大自然的体验非常类似于对人类的体验。如果一个人带着一种固定的 “理论 ”去接近另一个人,把他当作必须自卫的 “敌人”,他也会做出类似的反应,这样,他的 “理论 ”显然就会得到经验的证实。同样,大自然也会根据其所采用的理论做出反应。因此,在古代,人们认为瘟疫是不可避免的,这种想法促使他们的行为方式是传播导致瘟疫传播的条件。根据现代科学形式的见解,人类的行为使他停止了导致瘟疫传播的不卫生的生活方式,因此瘟疫不再是不可避免的。
理论洞见之所以不能超越现有的局限,不能随着新的事实而变化,正是因为人们相信理论能提供关于现实的真实知识(当然,这意味着理论永远不需要改变)。虽然我们现代的思维方式相对于古代思维方式已经发生了很大变化,但两者有一个共同的关键特征:即它们通常都被理论能提供关于“现实本来面目”的真实知识这一观念所“蒙蔽”。因此,两者都将理论洞见在我们感知中引发的形式和形状与独立于我们的思想和观察方式的现实相混淆。这种混淆至关重要,因为它导致我们用或多或少固定的、有限的思维形式来看待自然、社会和个体,并且显然在经验中不断地证实这些思维形式的局限性。
这种对我们思维模式局限性的无休止的确认,对于碎片化尤为重要,因为如前所述,每种形式的理论洞察都会引入自己的本质区别和区分(例如,在古代,本质区别是天上物质和地上物质,而在牛顿理论中,本质区别是所有物质坠落的中心)。如果我们把这些差异和区别视为观察方法,视为感知的指南,这并不意味着它们表示单独存在的物质或实体。
另一方面,如果我们将我们的理论视为“对现实的直接描述”,那么我们将不可避免地把这些差异和区别视为分裂,这意味着理论中出现的各种基本术语是独立存在的。因此,我们将产生这样的错觉:世界实际上是由独立的碎片构成的,而且正如已经指出的那样,这将导致我们采取这样的行动,即我们实际上产生了我们对理论的态度所暗示的分裂。
强调这一点很重要。例如,有人可能会说:“城市、宗教、政治体系的分裂、战争形式的冲突、普遍的暴力、自相残杀等都是现实。整体性只是一种我们或许应该为之奋斗的理想。”但这并不是这里所说的。相反,应该说的是,整体是真实的,而分裂是整体对人类行为的反应,这种行为受到虚幻的感知的引导,而虚幻的感知是由碎片化的思想形成的。换句话说,正是因为现实是完整的,人类以碎片化的方式不可避免地会得到相应的碎片化回应。因此,人类需要关注碎片化思维的习惯,意识到这一点,从而结束它。人类对待现实的方式可能是整体的,回应也将是整体的。
然而,要做到这一点,至关重要的是,人类必须意识到自己的思维活动本身;也就是说,把它作为一种洞察、一种观察方式,而不是“现实的真实副本”。
显然,我们可能有多种不同的见解。我们所需要的不是思想的整合,也不是某种强加的统一,因为任何这种强加的观点本身都只是另一个碎片。相反,我们所有不同的思维方式都应被视为看待一个现实的不同方式,每种方式都有一些清晰和充分的领域。我们确实可以将一种理论与某个对象的特定观点进行比较,每种观点都只给出对象在某些方面的外观,整个对象不是在任何一种观点中被感知到的,而是,它只是被隐含地理解为在所有这些观点中显示的单一现实。当我们深刻理解我们的理论也是这样运作的时候,我们就不会习惯于把现实看作是由独立存在的片段构成的,当我们把我们的理论看作“对现实的直接描述”时,这些片段与在我们的思想和想象中的样子相对应。
除了对上述理论的作用有一般认识之外,还需要特别关注那些有助于表达我们整体自我世界观的理论。因为在很大程度上,正是在这些世界观中,我们对现实性质以及我们的思想与现实之间关系的一般概念是隐含或明确的。在这方面,物理学的一般理论起着重要作用,因为它们被视为处理的是构成一切的物质的普遍性质,以及描述所有物质运动的空间和时间。
以原子论为例,该理论由德谟克利特于 2000 多年前首次提出。从本质上讲,该理论引导我们将世界视为由原子构成,原子在虚空中运动。大型物体不断变化的形式和特征现在被视为运动原子排列变化的结果。显然,这种观点在某种程度上是实现整体性的重要方式,因为它使人们能够通过贯穿整个存在的单一虚空,根据一组基本成分的运动来理解整个世界的巨大变化。然而,随着原子论的发展,它最终成为对现实进行碎片化研究的主要支持。因为它不再被视为一种洞察力、一种观察方式,而是人们将整个现实实际上仅由“原子构件”构成的概念视为绝对真理,所有这些构件或多或少都以机械的方式协同工作。
当然,把任何物理理论视为绝对真理必然会固化物理学的一般思维形式,从而导致分裂。但除此之外,原子理论的特殊内容特别容易导致分裂,因为这种内容隐含着整个自然界,以及人类,包括大脑、神经系统、思维等,原则上可以完全按照独立存在的原子集合体的结构和功能来理解。在人类的实验和一般经验中,这种原子观得到证实,这一事实当然被视为这一观念的正确性和普遍真理性的证据。因此,几乎整个科学的重心都集中在对现实的碎片化态度上。
但必须指出的是(通常情况下是这样),原子观点的实验验证是有限的。事实上,在量子理论和相对论所涵盖的领域中,原子论的概念引发了令人困惑的问题,这表明需要新的洞察力,这种洞察力与原子论不同,后者与之前的理论也不同。
因此,量子理论表明,试图精确地描述和跟踪原子粒子是没有意义的。(第 5 章将详细介绍这一点。)原子路径的概念适用范围有限。在更详细的描述中,原子在许多方面表现得像波和粒子。也许最好将它看作一朵定义不明确的云,其特定形式取决于整个环境,包括观察仪器。因此,人们不能再维持观察者和被观察者之间的划分(这隐含在原子论观点中,原子论观点将每个观察者和被观察者视为独立的原子集合)。相反,观察者和被观察者都是一个整体现实的融合和相互渗透的方面,这个整体现实是不可分割和不可分析的。
相对论引导我们以一种在某些关键方面与上述观点相似的视角来看待世界(有关这一点的更多详细信息,请参阅第 5 章)。从爱因斯坦的观点来看,不可能存在任何比光速更快的信号,因此,刚体的概念不成立。但这一概念在经典原子理论中至关重要,因为在该理论中,宇宙的最终组成部分必须是不可分割的小物体,而这只有当这种物体的每个部分都与所有其他部分刚性结合时才有可能。在相对论中,需要完全放弃世界由基本物体或“构建块”构成的概念。相反,人们必须从事件和过程的普遍流动的角度来看待世界。因此,如图 1.1 中的 A 和 B 所示,人们不是考虑粒子,而是考虑“世界管”。
这个世界管道代表着一个无限复杂的结构运动和发展过程,该过程以管道边界所指示的区域为中心。然而,即使在管道外部,每个“粒子”也有一个延伸到空间并与其他粒子的场融合的场。
更生动地描绘出这种含义的形象是将波形视为流动水流中的涡旋结构。如图 1.2 所示,两个涡旋对应于流体的稳定流动模式,大致以 A 和 B 为中心。显然,这两个涡旋应被视为抽象概念,通过我们的思维方式在我们的感知中脱颖而出。实际上,当然,这两个抽象的流动模式融合并统一在流动水流的整体运动中。它们之间没有明显的界限,也不应被视为单独或独立存在的实体。
相对论要求用这种方式来看待构成所有物质的原子粒子,当然也包括人类,包括他们的大脑、神经系统以及他们建造并在实验室中使用的观测仪器。因此,从不同的角度来看待这个问题,相对论和量子理论是一致的,因为它们都意味着需要将世界视为一个不可分割的整体,在这个整体中,宇宙的所有部分,包括观察者和他的仪器,都融合并统一为一个整体。在这个整体中,原子形式的洞察力是一种简化和抽象,只在某些有限的背景下有效。
这种新形式的洞察力也许最好被称为流动运动中的不可分割的整体。这种观点意味着流动在某种意义上先于在这种流动中形成和消散的“事物”。我们可以通过考虑“意识流”来说明这里的意思。这种意识流动无法准确定义,但显然先于在流动中形成和消散的可定义的思想和观念形式,就像流动的溪流中的涟漪、波浪和漩涡一样。正如溪流中的这种运动模式一样,一些想法会以或多或少稳定的方式反复出现和持续存在,而其他想法则会转瞬即逝。
一种新的普遍洞察力的提议是,所有物质都具有这种性质:也就是说,存在一种无法明确定义而只能隐含地了解的普遍流动,正如可以从普遍流动中抽象出来的明确定义的形式和形状所表明的那样,这些形式和形状有些稳定,有些不稳定。在这种流动中,精神和物质不是独立的物质。相反,它们是一个整体和不间断运动的不同方面。这样,我们就能把存在的所有方面看作是不可分割的,从而结束当前对原子观点的态度中隐含的分裂,这种分裂导致我们彻底地将一切事物分开。然而,我们可以理解原子论的那个方面,它仍然提供了一种正确和有效的洞察力形式;即,尽管流动运动具有不可分割的整体性,但从中抽象出的各种模式具有一定的相对自主性和稳定性,这确实是流动运动的普遍规律所规定的。然而现在,我们已经清楚地认识到这种自主性和稳定性的限度。
因此,在特定情况下,我们可以采用其他各种形式的洞察,使我们能够简化某些事物,并暂时将它们视为独立、稳定,甚至可能独立存在。然而,我们不应陷入以这种方式看待我们自己和整个世界的陷阱。因此,我们的思想不再会导致现实实际上是碎片化的幻觉,也不再会导致因这种幻觉而产生的感知的碎片化行为。
原文:
FRAGMENTATION AND WHOLENESS
The title of this chapter is ‘Fragmentation and wholeness’. It is especially important to consider this question today, for frag- mentation is now very widespread, not only throughout society, but also in each individual; and this is leading to a kind of general confusion of the mind, which creates an endless series of problems and interferes with our clarity of perception so seriously as to prevent us from being able to solve most of them.
Thus art, science, technology, and human work in general, are divided up into specialities, each considered to be separate in essence from the others. Becoming dissatisfied with this state of affairs, men have set up further interdisciplinary subjects, which were intended to unite these specialities, but these new subjects have ultimately served mainly to add further separate fragments. Then, society as a whole has developed in such a way that it is broken up into separate nations and different religious, political, economic, racial groups, etc. Man’s natural environment has correspondingly been seen as an aggregate of separately existent parts, to be exploited by different groups of people. Similarly, each individual human being has been fragmented into a large number of separate and conflicting compartments, according to his different desires, aims, ambitions, loyalties, psychological characteristics, etc., to such an extent that it is generally accepted that some degree of neurosis is inevitable, while many indi- viduals going beyond the ‘normal’ limits of fragmentation are classified as paranoid, schizoid, psychotic, etc.
The notion that all these fragments are separately existent is evidently an illusion, and this illusion cannot do other than lead to endless conflict and confusion. Indeed, the attempt to live according to the notion that the fragments are really separate is, in essence, what has led to the growing series of extremely urgent crises that is confronting us today. Thus, as is now well known, this way of life has brought about pollution, destruction of the balance of nature, over-population, world-wide economic and political disorder, and the creation of an overall environment that is neither physically nor mentally healthy for most of the people who have to live in it. Individually there has developed a widespread feeling of helplessness and despair, in the face of what seems to be an overwhelming mass of disparate social forces, going beyond the control and even the comprehension of the human beings who are caught up in it.
Indeed, to some extent, it has always been both necessary and proper for man, in his thinking, to divide things up, and to separate them, so as to reduce his problems to manageable pro- portions; for evidently, if in our practical technical work we tried to deal with the whole of reality all at once, we would be swamped. So, in certain ways, the creation of special subjects of study and the division of labour was an important step forward. Even earlier, man’s first realization that he was not identical with nature was also a crucial step, because it made possible a kind of autonomy in his thinking, which allowed him to go beyond the immediately given limits of nature, first in his imagination and ultimately in his practical work.
Nevertheless, this sort of ability of man to separate himself from his environment and to divide and apportion things ultimately led to a wide range of negative and destructive results, because man lost awareness of what he was doing and thus extended the process of division beyond the limits within which it works properly. In essence, the process of division is a way of thinking about things that is convenient and useful mainly in the domain of practical, technical and functional activities (e.g., to divide up an area of land into different fields where various crops are to be grown). However, when this mode of thought is applied more broadly to man’s notion of himself and the whole world in which he lives (i.e. to his self-world view), then man ceases to regard the resulting divisions as merely useful or convenient and begins to see and experience himself and his world as actually constituted of separately existent fragments. Being guided by a fragmentary self-world view, man then acts in such a way as to try to break himself and the world up, so that all seems to correspond to his way of thinking. Man thus obtains an appar- ent proof of the correctness of his fragmentary self-world view though, of course, he overlooks the fact that it is he himself, acting according to his mode of thought, who has brought about the fragmentation that now seems to have an autonomous existence, independent of his will and of his desire.
Men have been aware from time immemorial of this state of apparently autonomously existent fragmentation and have often projected myths of a yet earlier ‘golden age’, before the split between man and nature and between man and man had yet taken place. Indeed, man has always been seeking wholeness – mental, physical, social, individual.
It is instructive to consider that the word ‘health’ in English is based on an Anglo-Saxon word ‘hale’ meaning ‘whole’: that is, to be healthy is to be whole, which is, I think, roughly the equivalent of the Hebrew ‘shalem’. Likewise, the English ‘holy’ is based on the same root as ‘whole’. All of this indicates that man has sensed always that wholeness or integrity is an absolute necessity to make life worth living. Yet, over the ages, he has generally lived in fragmentation.
Surely, the question of why all this has come about requires careful attention and serious consideration.
In this chapter, attention will be focused on the subtle but crucial role of our general forms of thinking in sustaining frag- mentation and in defeating our deepest urges toward wholeness or integrity. In order to give the discussion a concrete content we shall to some extent talk in terms of current scientific research, which is a field that is relatively familiar to me (though, of course, the overall significance of the questions under discussion will also be kept in mind).
What will be emphasized, first of all in scientific research and later in a more general context, is that fragmentation is continu- ally being brought about by the almost universal habit of taking the content of our thought for ‘a description of the world as it is’. Or we could say that, in this habit, our thought is regarded as in direct correspondence with objective reality. Since our thought is pervaded with differences and distinctions, it follows that such a habit leads us to look on these as real divisions, so that the world is then seen and experienced as actually broken up into fragments.
The relationship between thought and reality that this thought is about is in fact far more complex than that of a mere correspondence. Thus, in scientific research, a great deal of our thinking is in terms of theories. The word ‘theory’ derives from the Greek ‘theoria’, which has the same root as ‘theatre’, in a word meaning ‘to view’ or ‘to make a spectacle’. Thus, it might be said that a theory is primarily a form of insight, i.e. a way of looking at the world, and not a form of knowledge of how the world is.
In ancient times, for example, men had the theory that celes- tial matter was fundamentally different from earthly matter and that it was natural for earthly objects to fall while it was natural for celestial objects, such as the moon, to remain up in the sky. With the coming of the modern era, however, scientists began to develop the viewpoint that there was no essential difference between earthly matter and celestial matter. This implied, of course, that heavenly objects, such as the moon, ought to fall, but for a long time men did not notice this implication. In a sudden flash of insight Newton then saw that as the apple falls so does the moon, and so indeed do all objects. Thus, he was led to the theory of universal gravitation, in which all objects were seen as falling toward various centres (e.g. the earth, the sun, the planets, etc.). This constituted a new way of looking at the heavens, in which the movements of the planets were no longer seen through the ancient notion of an essential difference between heavenly and earthly matter. Rather, one considered these movements in terms of rates of fall of all matter, heavenly and earthly, toward various centres, and when something was seen not to be accounted for in this way, one looked for and often discovered new and as yet unseen planets toward which celestial objects were falling (thus demonstrating the relevance of this way of looking).
The Newtonian form of insight worked very well for several centuries but ultimately (like the ancient Greek insights that came before) it led to unclear results when extended into new domains. In these new domains, new forms of insight were developed (the theory of relativity and the quantum theory). These gave a radically different picture of the world from that of Newton (though the latter was, of course, found to be still valid in a limited domain). If we supposed that theories gave true knowledge, corresponding to ‘reality as it is’, then we would have to conclude that Newtonian theory was true until around 1900, after which it suddenly became false, while relativity and quantum theory suddenly became the truth. Such an absurd conclusion does not arise, however, if we say that all theories are insights, which are neither true nor false but, rather, clear in certain domains, and unclear when extended beyond these domains. This means, however, that we do not equate theories with hypotheses. As the Greek root of the word indicates, a hypothesis is a supposition, that is, an idea that is ‘put under’ our reasoning, as a provisional base, which is to be tested experimentally for its truth or falsity. As is now well known, however, there can be no conclusive experimental proof of the truth or falsity of a general hypothesis which aims to cover the whole of reality. Rather, one finds (e.g., as in the case of the Ptolemaic epicycles or of the failure of Newtonian concepts just before the advent of relativity and quantum theory) that older theories become more and more unclear when one tries to use them to obtain insight into new domains. Careful attention to how this happens is then generally the main clue toward new theories that constitute further new forms of insight.
So, instead of supposing that older theories are falsified at a certain point in time, we merely say that man is continually developing new forms of insight, which are clear up to a point and then tend to become unclear. In this activity, there is evi- dently no reason to suppose that there is or will be a final form of insight (corresponding to absolute truth) or even a steady series of approximations to this. Rather, in the nature of the case, one may expect the unending development of new forms of in- sight (which will, however, assimilate certain key features of the older forms as simplifications, in the way that relativity theory does with Newtonian theory). As pointed out earlier, how- ever, this means that our theories are to be regarded primarily as ways of looking at the world as a whole (i.e. world views) rather than as ‘absolutely true knowledge of how things are’ (or as a steady approach toward the latter).
When we look at the world through our theoretical insights, the factual knowledge that we obtain will evidently be shaped and formed by our theories. For example, in ancient times the fact about the motions of the planets was described in terms of the Ptolemaic idea of epicycles (circles superimposed on circles). In Newton’s time, this fact was described in terms of precisely determined planetary orbits, analysed through rates of fall toward various centres. Later came the fact as seen relativistically according to Einstein’s concepts of space and time. Still later, a very different sort of fact was specified in terms of the quantum theory (which gives in general only a statistical fact). In biology, the fact is now described in terms of the theory of evolution, but in earlier times it was expressed in terms of fixed species of living beings.
More generally, then, given perception and action, our theor- etical insights provide the main source of organization of our factual knowledge. Indeed, our overall experience is shaped in this way. As seems to have been first pointed out by Kant, all experience is organized according to the categories of our thought, i.e., on our ways of thinking about space, time, matter, substance, causality, contingency, necessity, universality, par- ticularity, etc. It can be said that these categories are general forms of insight or ways of looking at everything, so that in a certain sense, they are a kind of theory (but, of course, this level of theory must have developed very early in man’s evolution).
Clarity of perception and thought evidently requires that we be generally aware of how our experience is shaped by the insight (clear or confused) provided by the theories that are implicit or explicit in our general ways of thinking. To this end, it is useful to emphasize that experience and knowledge are one process, rather than to think that our knowledge is about some sort of separate experience. We can refer to this one process as experience-knowledge (the hyphen indicating that these are two inseparable aspects of one whole movement).
Now, if we are not aware that our theories are ever-changing forms of insight, giving shape and form to experience in gen- eral, our vision will be limited. One could put it like this: experience with nature is very much like experience with human beings. If one approaches another man with a fixed ‘theory’ about him as an ‘enemy’ against whom one must defend oneself, he will respond similarly, and thus one’s ‘theory’ will apparently be confirmed by experience. Similarly, nature will respond in accordance with the theory with which it is approached. Thus, in ancient times, men thought plagues were inevitable, and this thought helped make them behave in such a way as to propagate the conditions responsible for their spread. With modern scien- tific forms of insights man’s behaviour is such that he ceases the insanitary modes of life responsible for spreading plagues and thus they are no longer inevitable.
What prevents theoretical insights from going beyond exist- ing limitations and changing to meet new facts is just the belief that theories give true knowledge of reality (which implies, of course, that they need never change). Although our modern way of thinking has, of course, changed a great deal relative to the ancient one, the two have had one key feature in common: i.e. they are both generally ‘blinkered’ by the notion that theories give true knowledge about ‘reality as it is’. Thus, both are led to confuse the forms and shapes induced in our perceptions by theoretical insight with a reality independent of our thought and our way of looking. This confusion is of crucial significance, since it leads us to approach nature, society, and the individual in terms of more or less fixed and limited forms of thought, and thus, apparently, to keep on confirming the limitations of these forms of thought in experience.
This sort of unending confirmation of limitations in our modes of thinking is particularly significant with regard to fragmentation, for as pointed out earlier, every form of theor- etical insight introduces its own essential differences and distinc- tions (e.g., in ancient times an essential distinction was between heavenly and earthly matter, while in Newtonian theory it was essential to distinguish the centres toward which all matter was falling). If we regard these differences and distinctions as ways of looking, as guides to perception, this does not imply that they denote separately existent substances or entities.
On the other hand, if we regard our theories as ‘direct descriptions of reality as it is’, then we will inevitably treat these differences and distinctions as divisions, implying separate exist- ence of the various elementary terms appearing in the theory. We will thus be led to the illusion that the world is actually constituted of separate fragments and, as has already been indi- cated, this will cause us to act in such a way that we do in fact produce the very fragmentation implied in our attitude to the theory.
It is important to give some emphasis to this point. For example, some might say: ‘Fragmentation of cities, religions, political systems, conflict in the form of wars, general violence, fratricide, etc., are the reality. Wholeness is only an ideal, toward which we should perhaps strive.’ But this is not what is being said here. Rather, what should be said is that wholeness is what is real, and that fragmentation is the response of this whole to man’s action, guided by illusory perception, which is shaped by fragmentary thought. In other words, it is just because reality is whole that man, with his fragmentary approach, will inevitably be answered with a correspondingly fragmentary response. So what is needed is for man to give attention to his habit of frag- mentary thought, to be aware of it, and thus bring it to an end. Man’s approach to reality may then be whole, and so the response will be whole.
For this to happen, however, it is crucial that man be aware of the activity of his thought as such; i.e. as a form of insight, a way of looking, rather than as a ‘true copy of reality as it is’.
It is clear that we may have any number of different kinds of insights. What is called for is not an integration of thought, or a kind of imposed unity, for any such imposed point of view would itself be merely another fragment. Rather, all our different ways of thinking are to be considered as different ways of look- ing at the one reality, each with some domain in which it is clear and adequate. One may indeed compare a theory to a particular view of some object. Each view gives only an appearance of the object in some aspect. The whole object is not perceived in any one view but, rather, it is grasped only implicitly as that single reality which is shown in all these views. When we deeply understand that our theories also work in this way, then we will not fall into the habit of seeing reality and acting toward it as if it were constituted of separately existent fragments corresponding to how it appears in our thought and in our imagination when we take our theories to be ‘direct descriptions of reality as it is’.
Beyond a general awareness of the role of theories as indicated above, what is needed is to give special attention to those theor- ies that contribute to the expression of our overall self-world views. For, to a considerable extent, it is in these world views that our general notions of the nature of reality and of the relation- ship between our thought and reality are implicity or explicitly formed. In this respect, the general theories of physics play an important part, because they are regarded as dealing with the universal nature of the matter out of which all is constituted, and the space and time in terms of which all material movement is described.
Consider, for example, the atomic theory, which was first proposed by Democritus more than 2,000 years ago. In essence, this theory leads us to look at the world as constituted of atoms, moving in the void. The ever-changing forms and characteristics of large-scale objects are now seen as the results of changing arrangements of the moving atoms. Evidently, this view was, in certain ways, an important mode of realization of wholeness, for it enabled men to understand the enormous variety of the whole world in terms of the movements of one single set of basic constituents, through a single void that permeates the whole of existence. Nevertheless, as the atomic theory developed, it ulti- mately became a major support for a fragmentary approach to reality. For it ceased to be regarded as an insight, a way of look- ing, and men regarded instead as an absolute truth the notion that the whole of reality is actually constituted of nothing but ‘atomic building blocks’, all working together more or less mechanically.
Of course, to take any physical theory as an absolute truth must tend to fix the general forms of thought in physics and thus to contribute to fragmentation. Beyond this, however, the par- ticular content of the atomic theory was such as to be especially conducive to fragmentation, for it was implicit in this content that the entire world of nature, along with the human being, including his brain, his nervous system, his mind, etc., could in principle be understood completely in terms of structures and functions of aggregates of separately existent atoms. The fact that in man’s experiments and general experience this atomic view was confirmed was, of course, then taken as proof of the correctness and indeed the universal truth of this notion. Thus almost the whole weight of science was put behind the fragmentary approach to reality.
It is important to point out, however, that (as usually happens in such cases) the experimental confirmation of the atomic point of view is limited. Indeed, in the domains covered by quantum theory and relativity, the notion of atomism leads to confused questions, which indicate the need for new forms of insight, as different from atomism as the latter is from theories that came before it.
Thus, the quantum theory shows that the attempt to describe and follow an atomic particle in precise detail has little meaning. (Further detail on this point is given in chapter 5.) The notion of an atomic path has only a limited domain of applicability. In a more detailed description the atom is, in many ways, seen to behave as much like a wave as a particle. It can perhaps best be regarded as a poorly defined cloud, dependent for its particular form on the whole environment, including the observing instrument. Thus, one can no longer maintain the division between the observer and observed (which is implicit in the atomistic view that regards each of these as separate aggregates of atoms). Rather, both observer and observed are merging and interpenetrating aspects of one whole reality, which is indivisible and unanalysable.
Relativity leads us to a way of looking at the world that is similar to the above in certain key respects (see chapter 5 for more detail on this point). From the fact that in Einstein’s point of view no signal faster than light is possible, it follows that the concept of a rigid body breaks down. But this concept is crucial in the classical atomic theory, for in this theory the ultimate constituents of the universe have to be small indivisible objects, and this is possible only if each part of such an object is bound rigidly to all other parts. What is needed in a relativistic theory is to give up altogether the notion that the world is constituted of basic objects or ‘building blocks’. Rather, one has to view the world in terms of universal flux of events and processes. Thus, as indicated by A and B in figure 1.1, instead of thinking of a particle, one is to think of a ‘world tube’.
This world tube represents an infinitely complex process of a structure in movement and development which is centred in a region indicated by the boundaries of the tube. However, even outside the tube, each ‘particle’ has a field that extends through space and merges with the fields of other particles.
A more vivid image of the sort of thing that is meant is afforded by considering wave forms as vortex structures in a flowing stream. As shown in figure 1.2, two vortices correspond to stable patterns of flow of the fluid, centred more or less at A and B. Evidently, the two vortices are to be considered as abstractions, made to stand out in our perception by our way of thinking. Actually, of course, the two abstracted flow patterns merge and unite, in one whole movement of the flowing stream. There is no sharp division between them, nor are they to be regarded as separately or independently existent entities.
Relativity theory calls for this sort of way of looking at the atomic particles, which constitute all matter, including of course human beings, with their brains, nervous systems, and the observing instruments that they have built and that they use in their laboratories. So, approaching the question in different ways, relativity and quantum theory agree, in that they both imply the need to look on the world as an undivided whole, in which all parts of the universe, including the observer and his instruments, merge and unite in one totality. In this totality, the atomistic form of insight is a simplification and an abstraction, valid only in some limited context.
The new form of insight can perhaps best be called Undivided Wholeness in Flowing Movement. This view implies that flow is, in some sense, prior to that of the ‘things’ that can be seen to form and dissolve in this flow. One can perhaps illustrate what is meant here by considering the ‘stream of consciousness’. This flux of awareness is not precisely definable, and yet it is evidently prior to the definable forms of thoughts and ideas which can be seen to form and dissolve in the flux, like ripples, waves and vortices in a flowing stream. As happens with such patterns of movement in a stream some thoughts recur and persist in a more or less stable way, while others are evanescent.
The proposal for a new general form of insight is that all matter is of this nature: That is, there is a universal flux that cannot be defined explicitly but which can be known only implicitly, as indicated by the explicitly definable forms and shapes, some stable and some unstable, that can be abstracted from the universal flux. In this flow, mind and matter are not separate substances. Rather, they are different aspects of one whole and unbroken movement. In this way, we are able to look on all aspects of existence as not divided from each other, and thus we can bring to an end the fragmentation implicit in the current attitude toward the atomic point of view, which leads us to divide everything from everything in a thoroughgoing way. Nevertheless, we can comprehend that aspect of atomism which still provides a correct and valid form of insight; i.e. that in spite of the undivided wholeness in flowing movement, the various patterns that can be abstracted from it have a certain relative autonomy and stability, which is indeed provided for by the universal law of the flowing movement. Now, however, we have the limits of this autonomy and stability sharply in mind.
Thus we can, in specified contexts, adopt other various forms of insight that enable us to simplify certain things and to treat them momentarily and for certain limited purposes as if they were autonomous and stable, as well as perhaps separately exist- ent. Yet we do not have to fall into the trap of looking at our- selves and at the whole world in this way. Thus our thought need no longer lead to the illusion that reality actually is of fragmentary nature, and to the corresponding fragmentary actions that arise out of perception clouded by such illusion.
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