最新论文发表

Scientific Reports vol.3: No.3292 (2013)

Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game:

Better Condition Results in Less Payoff

流行病博弈中的布雷斯佯谬—

优裕条件带来低劣回报

作者： Hai-Feng Zhang (张海峰)，Zimo Yang（杨紫陌），

Zhi-Xi Wu（吴枝喜），Bing-Hong Wang（汪秉宏），

Tao Zhou（周涛）

Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions

to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with

competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic

model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire,  and could adjust their strategies  according to their neighbors' strategies and payoffs at the beginning of

each new season of epidemic spreading. We found a

counter-intuitive phenomenon analogous to the well-known Braess's Paradox, namely a better condition may lead to

worse performance. Specifically speaking, increasing the successful rate

of self-protection does not  necessarily reduce the epidemic  size or improve the system payoff. The range and

degree of the Braess's Paradox are sensitive to both the

parameters characterizing the epidemic spreading and the strategy payoff,

while the existence of the Braess's Paradox is insensitive

to the network topologies. This phenomenon can be well explained

by a meanfield approximation.  Our study demonstrates an important fact

that a better condition for individuals may yield a worse outcome

for the society.

Scientific Reports article  PDF 下载

 srep03292.pdf

Scientic Reports Supplementary Information (2.42 MB)  下载

srep03292-s1.pdf